Abstract
A Standard Essential Patent (SEP) is a patent that is chosen to streamline a chosen industry standard to promote economic growth and consumer satisfaction. Consumers interact with SEPs in almost everything they do in their daily life, from connecting to WIFI to charging any device. This is possible because the patent selection process requires patent owners to license their patents on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms (FRAND) upon selection. Yet, without proper regulation, this is easier said than done. Often SEP implementers are left with two options, entering exploitative agreements or rely on litigation to address unchecked anticompetitive behavior. This comment proposes implementing a licensing notification and review process, similar to the premerger notification and merger review process. Section one examines the intersection between Innovation, SEP licensing, and Antitrust law. Section two uses case law to highlight the current FRAND review process and the impact SEP holders have on trade. Finally, section three discusses implementing a notification and review process that mirrors the premerger notification and merger notification process, conducted by antitrust agencies, to further incentivize FRAND agreements that align with standardization requirements.
Repository Citation
Alexandra Perez,
The Role of Antitrust in Innovation: Standard Essential Patents,
30
Marq. Intell. Prop. & Innovation L. Rev.
131
(2025).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/ipilr/vol30/iss1/6