Abstract
In 2007, the Supreme Court decided MedImmune v. Genentech. This decision changed the landscape of the patent licensing field by holding that a licensee in good standing may challenge the validity of a patent in a declaratory judgment action. By adding to the cost of entering a license agreement, MedImmune erodes one characteristic of a patent from which it derives its worth—the patent’s ability to be licensed. Unfortunately, this has decreased the incentive to innovate by decreasing the value of a patent. This Comment seeks to illustrate, using a game theoretic model, how MedImmune will increase litigation against patent licensors, which in turn will increase the risk of entering a license agreement and decrease the value of a patent.
Repository Citation
Nicholas G. Smith,
Medimmune v. Genentech: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Continued Assault on the Patentee,
15 Marq. Intellectual Property L. Rev. 503
(2011).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/iplr/vol15/iss2/9