Abstract
Wisconsin involuntarily commits individuals at a rate nearly five times the national average, stripping them of core constitutional rights—including liberty, the ability to refuse treatment, and firearm possession. Yet, when these life-altering orders are appealed, they are almost always reviewed by a single appellate judge. This Comment argues that such a limited review undermines the constitutional weight of involuntary commitments, which closely mirror criminal convictions in the scope of rights deprived. Tracing the historical development of Wisconsin’s civil commitment statutes, this Comment demonstrates how commitments implicate both substantive and procedural due process concerns. It then compares Wisconsin’s one-judge review framework to the multi-judge approaches of neighboring states, analyzes the risks of judicial error, and weighs the minimal fiscal costs of reform. Ultimately, this Comment contends that Wisconsin should join its neighbors in requiring three-judge appellate panels for involuntary commitment appeals, ensuring that these cases—so central to personal liberty—receive the scrutiny they deserve.
Repository Citation
Caitlin Riordan,
Substituting One Judge for Another: The Lax Standard of Review in Involuntary Commitment,
108 Marq. L. Rev. 1105
(2025).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol108/iss4/8
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