Abstract
In Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., the Supreme Court resurrected a long-dormant theory of personal jurisdiction: that by registering to do business in a state, a corporation consents to general jurisdiction. This Comment critiques the Mallory plurality’s reliance on pre-International Shoe caselaw, arguing that the decision unnecessarily sidesteps decades of precedent, mistakes coercion for consent, and inaptly analogizes registration- jurisdiction statutes to tag jurisdiction on individuals. It further explores Justice Alito’s concurring concern that such statutes may violate the Dormant Commerce Clause by imposing disproportionate burdens on out-of-state corporations without corresponding state benefits. Finally, the Comment uses Wisconsin as a case study to explore whether states should adopt similar statutes, concluding that the costs of doing so, including court congestion and promoting forum shopping, far outweigh any potential advantages. After the Court cabined general jurisdiction over the past several decades, Mallory opens a controversial back door that courts and legislatures should approach with caution.
Repository Citation
Abigail Nilsson,
Railroading Interstate Corporations: Personal Jurisdiction and Dormant Commerce After Mallory V. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.,
108 Marq. L. Rev. 583
(2024).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol108/iss2/8