Abstract
A dissenting opinion is the Schrödinger’s cat of authorities: both the law and not the law simultaneously. Courts and scholars often clarify that a dissenting opinion is not binding. Outside the universe of precedent, that authority defies easy description. Emerging from the pen of a judge wearing a black robe and acting in an official capacity, a dissenting opinion exhibits the form of the law. Yet, beneath that lofty sheen, a dissent exhibits the substance of commentary. A dissenting judge writes to undercut the law, providing a case law coda. This Article describes the traditional categories of authority, primary and secondary, and argues that a dissenting opinion inhabits a hybrid category. As primary authority, a dissent enjoys the same rhetorical leeway as other opinions; as secondary authority, a dissent is an untethered critique of the law. Over the years, dissenting opinions from the Supreme Court provide enduring examples of a dissent’s mix of primary and secondary authority.
Repository Citation
Christina M. Frohock,
Schrödinger’s Dissent: The Hybrid Authority of a Dissenting Opinion,
107 Marq. L. Rev. 963
(2024).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol107/iss4/4
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