This Article analyzes Vega v. Tekoh, in which the Supreme Court ruled that

a violation of Miranda was not a violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege

against self-incrimination. This Article examines the original language of the

Miranda opinion, the statements and intentions of the members of the Miranda

Court, and subsequent precedent to determine Miranda’s true nature. Further,

this Article examines the reasoning of Vega and the dangers created by its

pronouncements, especially in light of the Court’s earlier characterization of

Miranda as a constitutional rule in Dickerson v. United States. This Article

asserts that the Justices who joined the Miranda opinion clearly and repeatedly

explained that Miranda’s warnings requirement was a constitutional right.

Further, Miranda itself indicated that it was establishing a right included within

the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Finally, this Article

suggests that Vega’s cramped reasoning rejecting Miranda’s constitutional

status, along with the Court’s inconsistent interpretation of Miranda over the

decades, has not only fatally weakened Miranda’s warnings requirement but

also undermined the Court’s own authority.