Abstract
This Article analyzes Vega v. Tekoh, in which the Supreme Court ruled that
a violation of Miranda was not a violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. This Article examines the original language of the
Miranda opinion, the statements and intentions of the members of the Miranda
Court, and subsequent precedent to determine Miranda’s true nature. Further,
this Article examines the reasoning of Vega and the dangers created by its
pronouncements, especially in light of the Court’s earlier characterization of
Miranda as a constitutional rule in Dickerson v. United States. This Article
asserts that the Justices who joined the Miranda opinion clearly and repeatedly
explained that Miranda’s warnings requirement was a constitutional right.
Further, Miranda itself indicated that it was establishing a right included within
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Finally, this Article
suggests that Vega’s cramped reasoning rejecting Miranda’s constitutional
status, along with the Court’s inconsistent interpretation of Miranda over the
decades, has not only fatally weakened Miranda’s warnings requirement but
also undermined the Court’s own authority.
Repository Citation
George M. Dery III,
Willfully Forgetting Miranda's True Nature: Vega V. Tekoh Severs the Warnings Requirement From the Constitution,
107 Marq. L. Rev. 769
(2024).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol107/iss3/6