Abstract
This article questions whether wills law's disapproval of partial intestacy rests on defensible assumptions about testamentary intent. After examining the causes of and antidotes to partial intestacy, I make three primary points. First, the presumption against intestacy applies only to wills that contain an ambiguous bequest of the residue. Second, the law's disapproval of partial intestacy is due in part to its failure to make an important distinction between testamentary intention and dispositive intention. Third, a theory of passive intention, heretofore barely alluded to in the law of wills, supplies the necessary validation of partially intestate estates.
Repository Citation
Richard F. Storrow,
What's Wrong with Partial Intestacy?,
100 Marq. L. Rev. 1387
(2017).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol100/iss4/8