JUDICIAL BLINDNESS TO EYEWITNESS MISIDENTIFICATION

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I. INTRODUCTION

As of this writing, 252 people have been exonerated by means of DNA evidence,1 most leaving prison cells after many years in prison. These exonerations represent only the “tip of an iceberg”2—the actual numbers of wrongly convicted people are undoubtedly much higher.3 The leading cause of wrongful convictions has been shown to be erroneous eyewitness identifications.4 Many studies of exonerations find that erroneous eyewitness identifications play a part in over 75% of all wrongful convictions.5 These studies have led to numerous proposals for the reform of police procedures,6 yet we see surprisingly little progress toward minimizing eyewitness identification error, a major cause of failure in our criminal justice systems.

In 1999, the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) National Institute of Justice

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2. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 62 (2008); see also Sandra Guerra Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering Uncorroborated Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1491 (2008) (arguing that “untold numbers of additional innocent people have been punished for crimes they did not commit”).


4. Thompson, supra note 2, at 1490 (citing studies of eyewitness testimony and wrongful convictions).

5. Id. at 1490–91; see also Innocence Project, Understand the Causes: Eyewitness Misidentification, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).

6. In an earlier essay, I compared the recommendations of the leading organizations that have conducted studies of eyewitness identifications. See Sandra Guerra Thompson, What Price Justice? The Importance of Costs to Eyewitness Identification Reform, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 33, 33 (2008). See also infra note 39 and accompanying text (listing reports that include proposed procedures for eyewitness identification).
published its influential study of eyewitness identification procedures that included detailed recommended guidelines. Following that effort, several other government and private task forces have followed suit and conducted additional independent studies, yielding similar proposals for reform. Over the past decade, it is fair to say that a growing consensus on state-of-the-art procedures for obtaining eyewitness identifications has emerged among reformers. Such procedures include techniques for reducing suggestion; for instance, having live lineups and photo arrays conducted by investigators who do not know the identity of the suspect, thus eliminating the possibility that the investigator might unconsciously influence the witness’s selection or give the witness confirmatory feedback (e.g., “Good, you picked the right guy.”) that has been found to bolster a witness’s confidence in the selection. Other recommendations pertain to how suspects are viewed, how witnesses are instructed, and how identification procedures are documented.

Reform groups have urged law enforcement to implement the recommended procedures voluntarily. Ten years after the Justice Department issued its report only a handful of states have adopted any reforms, whether as a matter of state constitutional law, evidentiary rules, or by statute. A handful of police departments have voluntarily implemented some of the critical reforms. Overall, the vast majority of the thousands of independent law enforcement agencies across the country have made few, if any, changes to the status quo.

7. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
8. Id.
9. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 42–54.
10. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1504–06; see also infra Part II.B.
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. Id.
13. Only a few states have adopted more protective state constitutional or evidentiary rules. See, e.g., State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 487, 492 (Utah 1986) (finding that trial courts should give a cautionary instruction regarding eyewitness identification in cases involving no corroborating evidence); State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 591, 593–95 (Wis. 2005) (relying on “extensive studies on the issue of identification” and citing Department of Justice (DOJ) guidelines, as well as social science findings, in rejecting federal due process reliability assessment for show-ups and making show-ups necessary to comply with state due process requirements). See also infra note 39 and accompanying text (citing reforms in North Carolina, New Jersey, and recommended procedures established in Wisconsin).
14. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
15. I have previously argued that police departments are unlikely to adopt the suggested reform procedures on their own initiative. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1519–20. At present, police departments apparently have not felt sufficient political pressure, or seen any other reason, to implement the changes of their own accord. Indeed, in some cases, the suggested reforms have been met with intense resistance by law enforcement. See SHERI H. MECKLENBURG, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS: THE ILLINOIS PILOT PROGRAM ON SEQUENTIAL DOUBLE-BLIND IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES, at iv (2006), available at http://www.chicagopolice.org/
This Article presents the findings of an empirical study of recent case law in which defendants challenge the legality of eyewitness identification procedures. The study involved a review of all cases within the calendar year beginning on April 8, 2008, and ending on April 8, 2009, in which state appellate courts issued opinions and in which the suggestiveness of eyewitness identification procedures were challenged. In the cases surveyed, only a small percentage of the police investigations followed any of the recommended procedures and usually the most critical procedures were not followed. The overwhelming majority of police departments in the cases surveyed followed the same suggestive procedures that have contributed to misidentifications and wrongful convictions in the past.16

The study reported here examines only cases that met the following conditions: (1) eyewitness identification was an important issue; (2) defendants asserted their right to trial and challenged the identification at trial; and (3) defendants continued to challenge the identification evidence on appeal. In a sense the cases examined here represent the most worrisome cases, those in which defendants have called upon the courts to correct perceived errors in the process. However, this survey does not tell us much about the remaining universe of cases in which eyewitness identification plays a role. It tells us nothing, for example, about the procedures actually followed in police departments throughout the country.17 Thus, we cannot draw any sweeping conclusions about overall police practices from this survey’s small sample. To obtain such information, one would have to conduct a massive survey of the tens of thousands of independent police agencies throughout the country. What this survey does provide, however, is a glimpse at a relatively small number of cases in which defense lawyers have asserted mistaken eyewitness identification both at trial and on appeal. Even this limited view is not encouraging.

As this Article will demonstrate, many of the same problems and practices that have contributed to erroneous identifications in the past continue to present themselves in recently decided cases. The reported appellate decisions often do not indicate whether other corroborating evidence of identification is present. However, some courts make clear that an eyewitness’s identification testimony was the sole basis for the conviction.18

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16. See infra notes 89–97 and accompanying text.
17. We can look to sources such as the Innocence Project which compile data on the states that have implemented reforms, but even that information tells us little about the procedures actually followed by police departments in most states. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Shabazz v. State, 667 S.E.2d 414, 416 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). I have previously called for a requirement that eyewitness identification testimony be corroborated in all cases to
Given the lessons drawn from countless social science studies about the particular factors that reduce eyewitness accuracy and the police practices that inject suggestiveness, it is a safe bet that at least some of the defendants from the dozens of cases reviewed were wrongly convicted.

How do appellate courts respond to the challenges to eyewitness identification evidence in these cases? In this study, none of the courts invoke state constitutional law or evidentiary rules to reject the suggestive practices decried by reformers. The courts do not exclude eyewitness testimony, even when it is obtained under circumstances that have been shown scientifically to be error-prone, nor do they find such testimony insufficient to support a verdict without additional corroborating evidence. Indeed, many of the appellate opinions continue to view the eyewitness’s degree of certainty as an indicator of reliability, despite the fact that social science research proves otherwise. Meanwhile, the courts often overlook other indicia of unreliability. Just as in the days before the reforms were proposed, the study shows that dubious eyewitness identification evidence continues to be admitted, and appellate courts continue to turn a blind eye to defense challenges based on suggestiveness and unreliability of such evidence. If one reads only the recent case law challenging suggestive identification procedures, one might get the impression that the innocence reform movement—and the exoneration of hundreds of innocent persons—never happened.

Part I of this Article provides a brief review of social science findings on eyewitness identifications, especially as they pertain to violent crimes perpetrated against strangers, and the reform procedures proposed by influential groups as a means of improving the accuracy of eyewitness identifications. These proposed reforms take into account social science research regarding both the weaknesses of eyewitness identification evidence and the effects of various police practices. Part III presents the findings of an empirical study of state appellate case law and provides data regarding the prevent erroneous convictions. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1523–43. Because no state has yet to implement such a corroborating evidence requirement, there are no such challenges to the lack of corroborating evidence. I reiterate here that a rule that would have the effect of requiring investigators to gather evidence beyond eyewitness identification testimony would go a long way to decrease erroneous convictions based on misidentification. Id. at 1523–28, 1540–43 (discussing trade-offs and feasibility of a corroboration rule).

19. See infra notes 109–12 and accompanying text.
20. Id.
21. See infra notes 134–35 and accompanying text.
22. A study of cases involving exonerations showed that constitutional challenges to eyewitness identifications had been rejected in 100% of the cases, again indicating that such challenges have proved utterly useless in ferreting out erroneous identifications. See Garrett, supra note 2, at 77. Apparently, even a heightened awareness of wrongful convictions and the perils of eyewitness identifications have not caused most appellate courts to review identification claims more generously. But see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
types of crimes in which mistaken identification (and, thus, innocence) is the main defense. The study examines the extent to which various factors are at play in these cases, such as the use of weapons, lighting conditions, the use of hats and disguises, and cross-racial identification. It also provides data on the types of identification procedures used and the extent to which suggestive procedures are followed. Part IV surveys the state appellate decisions in the study and demonstrates that state appellate courts typically ignore the well-established scientific literature and the calls for procedural improvements.

II. THE FACTORS THAT PRODUCE UNRELIABLE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY AND THE REFORM PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO REMEDY THE PROBLEM

After many decades of research, social scientists have amassed a wealth of literature proving definitively that certain variables reduce an eyewitness’s ability to make an accurate identification of a stranger. Unfortunately, many of these variables, known as “estimator variables,” are inherent in the fallibility of human beings as eyewitnesses and cannot be corrected by police procedure.

For example, there is nothing the police can do to change the fact that robbery victims often view their culprits in the dark, for only a brief period of time, and while the robber is aiming a gun or knife at the victim, which induces great stress in victims and causes them to focus on the weapon. Each of these estimator variables has been shown to decrease the accuracy of an identification. Also, the police cannot correct the increased risk of misidentification created by the fact that a culprit and a victim are not of the same race or by the fact that robbers often wear hats, disguises, or have facial hair.

Likewise, when witnesses are either very young or very old or have

23. For a general overview of the scientific literature pertinent to variables that reduce the accuracy of eyewitness identifications in violent crimes, see Thompson, supra note 2, at 1497–1506.


25. The effects of poor lighting and limited time for viewing on the ability to identify a stranger are obvious. See Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 277, 280–82 (2003) (noting that the accuracy of an eyewitness’s identification can be affected by many factors, including lighting conditions, amount of time the subject is viewed, whether the subject wears a disguise, lessened ability to recognize a person of a different race, and presence of a weapon, among others); ELIZABETH LOFTUS, JAMES M. DOYLE & JENNIFER E. DYSART, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 16–36 (4th ed. 2007) (addressing lighting, violence, stress and fear, and weapon focus). Scientific studies confirm the effects of “weapon focus” and stress, both of which have been shown to reduce the accuracy of eyewitness identifications. See Bruce W. Behrman & Sherrie L. Davey, Eyewitness Identification in Actual Criminal Cases: An Archival Analysis, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 475, 476 (2001); ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 35–36 (1996).

26. See Thompson supra note 2, at 1501 (on cross-racial identification); see also Wells &
used alcohol or controlled substances, studies have shown an increased risk of erroneous identification.\textsuperscript{27} It bears repeating that no police procedure can improve the inherent failings of a witness’s ability to recall the face of a stranger observed under difficult circumstances.

On the other hand, the police can greatly exacerbate the problem of inherently weak identifications by suggesting to the witness that a selection should be made or that the witness should choose a particular person. Factors that contribute to an increased risk of error are known as “system variables,”\textsuperscript{28} which refer to the variables that can be controlled by the system. The following sections address the system variables that can contribute to identification error and the reform protocols designed to reduce those risks.

A. The Social Science of Eyewitness Identification—The System Variables

With so many estimator variables present in violent crimes, it stands to reason that identification evidence in these kinds of cases will be particularly unreliable. Thus, it is critical that the police follow procedures shown to produce the most accurate identifications possible.

Experts consider as highly suggestive the single-suspect live viewings conducted near the time of the crime (so-called “show-ups”) because witnesses are likely to believe that the police have arrested the correct person.\textsuperscript{29} An eyewitness may wrongly assume that the police “know” the displayed person is guilty, when, in fact, the police may not have any idea whether the person is the culprit. If the suspect is shown in the back of a police car or wearing handcuffs, the situation further suggests to the witness that the police have caught the “right guy.”

On the other hand, show-ups have some advantages. The scientific literature confirms that delay in conducting an identification procedure will reduce reliability of the identification.\textsuperscript{30} Show-ups also allow the police to quickly clear individuals who may in fact be innocent. Therefore, most courts adopt the position that, on balance, the benefits of a show-up outweigh the concerns about suggestiveness.\textsuperscript{31} However, researchers have found that show-ups “result in more false identifications than line-ups.”\textsuperscript{32} In addition, show-

\textsuperscript{27} Loftus et al., supra note 25, at 281.

\textsuperscript{28} See Wells & Seelau, supra note 24, at 766.

\textsuperscript{29} Behrman & Davey, supra note 25, at 477 (citing studies).

\textsuperscript{30} Id. at 476.

\textsuperscript{31} See infra notes 127–32 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{32} Behrman & Davey, supra note 25, at 477.
ups, as well as single-photo identifications, create a secondary problem in that they taint subsequent pre-trial or in-court identifications by producing a higher level of confidence in the later identification. 33

Photo arrays or live lineups also can be conducted in a suggestive manner. For example, when asked to identify a culprit from a photo array or live lineup, eyewitnesses can be led to believe, or can erroneously assume, that the culprit is definitely among the persons presented. In such cases, eyewitnesses are prone to employ a psychological process known as “relative judgment” that causes them to choose the person who most closely resembles the culprit. 34 Identifications under these circumstances tend to be reliable if the true culprit is actually in the lineup or photo array, but such identifications are highly inaccurate if the true culprit is not present. 35 Thus, simultaneous presentation of individuals, together with statements indicating that the police believe they have arrested the right person, are two types of system variables that reduce the accuracy of eyewitness identifications. 36 If the identification procedure is conducted by the investigating officer who knows the identity of the suspect, there is also a concern that the officer may consciously or unconsciously give an eyewitness clues about which person is the suspect. 37 Likewise, if the investigating officer gives an eyewitness confirmatory feedback (e.g., “Good, you’ve picked the right guy.”), this feedback tends to inflate the witness’s confidence in the accuracy of the identification and has other distorting effects on a witness’s memory. 38

B. The Reform Recommendations

In the wake of numerous high-profile exonerations in the 1990s, various groups began to study scientific literature to determine what changes might be made to police procedure that would promote reliability in eyewitness identifications. In 1999, the DOJ published a highly influential report on eyewitness identifications with proposed protocols and procedures recommended for further study. Since then, several other respected groups such as the American Bar Association (ABA), private organizations, and several state agencies also have issued reports advocating improved procedures. 39 These recommendations are based on findings in social science

33. Id. at 488.
34. See Thompson supra note 2, at 1505–06.
35. Id. at 1506.
36. Id. at 1504–06.
37. Id. at 1504.
38. Id. at 1505 (citing studies).
literature regarding witness memory as well as on considerations of effective police practice.40 The proposals focus mostly on two eyewitness identification procedures: live lineups and photo arrays. The reports give much less attention to show-ups, which is unfortunate because show-ups constitute one of the most commonly used identification procedures.41

The principle recommendations concern the procedures used to conduct the identification, as well as the proper documentation of the identification process. For lineups and photo arrays, most of the proposals recommend what is known as “blind,” or “double-blind,” administration.42 In a blind identification procedure, the investigator conducting the lineup or photo array does not know the identity of the suspect.43 If the witness is also instructed that the investigator is unaware of the suspect’s identity, that is called “double-blind.”44 Using a double-blind procedure reduces suggestion in two


40. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 60–61 (addressing the extent to which reports take into account prudent considerations in recommending changes in police procedures).
41. Id. at 53–54.
42. The ABA, Innocence Project, North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission, the New Jersey guidelines, and the Justice Project all have called for blind procedures. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 41. Only the DOJ report is somewhat different; it tends to be more conservative in its conclusions and does not actually recommend the implementation of blind procedures. See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 9. Even so, it notes that “blind procedures . . . are used in science to prevent inadvertent contamination of research results, [but] may be impractical for some jurisdictions to implement.” Id. It does recommend, however, that blind procedures should be an area of “future exploration and field testing.” Id.
44. Id. at 389.
ways: (1) it ensures that the investigator conducting the identification procedure cannot, either consciously or unconsciously, suggest which person the witness should select; and (2) it deters witnesses, again consciously or unconsciously, from looking to investigators for clues about whom to select. It also eliminates the opportunity for the officer to give the witness confirmatory feedback after the identification.45

To combat the problem of relative judgment, whereby eyewitnesses tend to select the person who most closely resembles the culprit,46 researchers recommend that photos or live individuals be displayed in sequential fashion, rather than the traditional simultaneous fashion.47 The benefit of sequential presentation is that witnesses are less prone to select the wrong person. The disadvantage, from the perspective of investigating officers, is that witnesses are also less prone to make any selection at all.48 As a result, the published reports yield a less enthusiastic verdict on the adoption of sequential lineups and photo arrays. Private organizations, such as the Innocence Project and the Justice Project, have endorsed sequential presentation, while the ABA, DOJ, and the State of Illinois have endorsed field testing.49 Currently only two states, New Jersey and North Carolina, along with a few localities, mandate sequential presentation.50 Overall, the published reports agree that sequential procedures should be adopted, at least for purposes of field testing.

Show-ups, one of the most common methods used to obtain eyewitness identifications, have received scant attention, even from the reform proposals. The DOJ report provides a number of important guidelines, such as separating witnesses during a show-up.51 The Innocence Project further recommends that show-ups occur in a neutral location and manner, and that the suspect be displayed without handcuffs (when practicable) and removed from the squad car.52

For all identification methods, the proposals advocate proper documentation and the use of non-suggestive questioning from the beginning of an investigation through the identification process and thereafter.53 Also important is the use of cautionary instructions prior to the display of a suspect in a show-up, a photo array, or a lineup.54 In show-ups, witnesses should be

45. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
46. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1505–06.
47. Id. at 1519.
48. Id.
49. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 45–48.
50. Id. at 46–47.
51. Id. at 53.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 48–49, 52–53.
54. Id. at 52.
told that the person displayed may not be the culprit. In photo arrays or lineups, witnesses should be told that the suspect may or may not be present and, ideally, that the investigation will continue even if the witness makes no identification at that time. Finally, all of the proposals would require investigators to obtain and properly document a statement of the witness’s confidence in selecting a suspect immediately after the identification is made. The proposed changes to police protocol would go a long way in reducing the negative effects that may occur through the police–witness interaction.

Unfortunately, there appears to be little actual improvement in police practices. Organizations like the Innocence Project keep track of jurisdictions that adopt improved eyewitness identification procedures. It cites only two states and eight localities that have mandated sequential, double-blind procedures, which means that tens of thousands of police departments have yet to change their practices. For example, in Texas, a state that has not adopted new procedures on a statewide basis, a recent news report found that, of the roughly two-dozen police departments in the Dallas area, only two even had written policies for show-ups. This is especially alarming given that Dallas has uncovered nineteen wrongful convictions in the past few years. Even in the face of intense media scrutiny over the large number of exonerations in the Dallas area, the police departments in the region have not responded by implementing any new procedures for show-ups, a commonly used means of obtaining identifications. The use of show-ups in Dallas is

55. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-284.52(b)(3) (2007) (requiring instructions to a witness that the investigation will continue even if the witness does not make an identification).

56. Thompson, supra note 6, at 53. Asking for a witness’s confidence level at the time an identification is made reduces the common tendency for witnesses’ confidence levels to rise as they progress through the investigative and trial process. See John S. Shaw, III & Kimberley A. McClure, Repeated Postevent Questioning Can Lead to Elevated Levels of Eyewitness Confidence, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 629, 631, 647–48 (1996); see also infra notes 132–35, 142–44, and accompanying text (on effects of confirmatory feedback on witness confidence and jury instructions on witness confidence).

57. See Innocence Project, Eyewitness Identification Reform, available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/165.php (last visited Apr. 18, 2010). In addition, the State of Maryland, by a statute passed in 2007, requires police agencies to develop written policies on eyewitness identifications that must comply with DOJ standards. MD. CODE ANN. § 3-506 (2008). The DOJ standards do not require blind and sequential lineups and photo arrays; however, the standards recommend them for further study. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 8–9.


59. Id.

60. Id. (citing review of more than twenty years of appellate case law for the Dallas County area, and finding more than 100 felony convictions following trials that were based on show-ups). On the other hand, the Dallas Police Department has at long last implemented some improved
just one example; but there is every reason to believe that the same practices exist for police departments across the vast majority of the country.  

III. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF STATE APPELLATE DECISIONS IN EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION CASES

One hypothesis to be drawn from the research on eyewitness identifications is that identifications made under the typical circumstances of a violent crime are likely to be less reliable. Although many violent crimes are perpetrated between individuals who know each other, a substantial number of violent crimes are perpetrated between strangers. The typical scenario of these crimes displays factors that are known to reduce eyewitness identification reliability, such as use of a weapon, use of hats or disguises, poor lighting due to nighttime, and little time to view the suspect. The element of cross-race identification can be present as well. The findings of the study presented here answer two questions: (1) what types of crimes and circumstances are present among state appellate cases that raise eyewitness identification as a principle issue; and (2) what procedures were followed by the police in obtaining the identification evidence. Of critical importance is whether the police procedures comport with the reform procedures as specified by the DOJ and other groups.

In order to study appellate responses to identification evidence, I conducted a survey of all state appellate decisions handed down during the twelve-month period ending April 8, 2009, in which the introduction of eyewitness identification testimony was challenged. The research produced 128 cases, of which 31 were excluded, leaving a total of 96 cases studied,


61. See McGonigle & Emily, supra note 58.


63. For example, in 2008, 59% of victims of violent crime were related to or acquainted with their assailants, but 41% of victims were either assaulted by strangers or had an unknown relationship to their attackers. Id. at 5 tbl.6.

64. The survey was done via the Lexis search engine, searching all state court cases with the date restrictions of April 8, 2008 and April 8, 2009. LexisNexis, http://www.lexisnexis.com (last visited Apr. 18, 2010). The search terms were “‘eyewitness identification’ & suggestive.” These terms were considered sufficiently broad to capture all cases involving constitutional challenges to eyewitness identification testimony.

65. Cases were excluded for any of several reasons. First, cases were excluded if the eyewitness and the suspect knew each other from a prior relationship, or if an eyewitness identification was not actually challenged on appeal. When the witness has a prior relationship with
representing twenty-two states.

The survey demonstrates a couple of important points about the types of crimes in which eyewitness identifications play a critical role today. For instance, DNA evidence has essentially eliminated sexual assault cases from the mix of cases in which eyewitness identification testimony is critical. Of the ninety-six cases under review, only four cases (about 4%) involved a sexual assault. A recent study has shown that 100% of the cases in which individuals had been exonerated by means of DNA evidence involved sexual assault.66 Sexual assault cases in bygone days often relied solely on identification testimony to establish the identity of the perpetrator, and history has shown us that those eyewitnesses sometimes got it wrong. Because DNA evidence is generally available in sexual assault cases, the police nowadays routinely use DNA evidence to exclude wrongly identified suspects and prevent miscarriages of justice in almost all of those cases.

On the other hand, because DNA evidence is usually unavailable for most other crimes, the identification of culprits must still be made the old-fashioned way—through inherently unreliable eyewitness identification testimony. Of the ninety-six cases in the survey, 51% involved facts that constitute robbery.67 Another 32.3% involved murder, attempted murder, or assault. Of the suspect, the “identification” is simply a formality, and there is no real doubt that the witness would mistakenly identify an innocent person. Second, cases were excluded if the identifications were made prior to 1999, the year when the DOJ issued its influential report on eyewitness identification testimony. Because one aspect of the study examined the extent of compliance with DOJ standards, the study could not include identifications made prior to 1999. See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 39 (DOJ guideline on eyewitness evidence published in 1999). Cases in which the identification was made without any police involvement were also excluded from the study. In a few cases, the appeals presented no genuine issue relating to the eyewitness identification, so those cases were excluded as well.

66. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1491 n.12.

67. For purposes of the study, I have based the categorization of a case as involving “robbery” or “attempted robbery” if the facts involved a use of force or threat of force as a means of taking a person’s property against their will, or the attempt to do so. I did not base the category determination on the conviction charges, which can sometimes obscure the real gist of the crime involved. For example, a “carjacking” involves a use of force as a means of stealing a car and possibly other property. A prosecutor could charge this as a “burglary” in some states in which unlawfully entering a vehicle with intent to commit a felony can be considered burglary. The use of a weapon in such a case could lead to an unlawful weapon possession charge. It better serves our purposes to recognize that the facts fit the classic definition of robbery—a taking of property by means of force—better than they correspond with our traditional understanding of burglary as an unlawful entry into a habitation or as they fit a weapon possession charge, which tells us nothing about the violent nature of the crime. It is important to call the set of facts “robbery” because they belong to the category of cases that I argue is most likely to involve erroneous eyewitness identification testimony today. The robbery cases also include one conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery. In addition, in several cases, individuals were charged both with robbery and an assaultive offense such as kidnapping (n = 3), murder (n = 4), assault or attempted manslaughter (n = 4), or burglary (n = 3). All of these cases are included only in the category designated “Robbery/Attempted Robbery.”
the remaining cases, burglaries of homes made up 9.3%, thefts made up 2%, and false imprisonment accounted for 1% of the total. In short, almost all the cases (88.5%) involved murders, robberies, sexual assaults, or false imprisonment—serious violent crimes. Interestingly, of the burglary/home-invasion cases in the study, none involved the use of a weapon, even though burglaries are serious felonies with the potential for violence. If we add burglaries to the calculus, then 97.9% of the cases in the study involved a serious violent crime. All of the cases in the study included only stranger-on-stranger crimes. In approximately 43% of the cases, lighting conditions were not optimal because the crimes were committed during nighttime hours. In addition, 65.7% of the cases involved the use of weapons (fifty firearms, eleven knives, and two blunt objects (a pipe and a golf club)). In 11% of the cases, all of which were robberies, the culprits wore hats, had bandanas covering their noses and mouths, or had facial hair that obscured the features of their faces.

68. See infra Table 1.

69. One case in the study yielded convictions for both robbery and burglary. See State v. Smith, Nos. 21463, 22334, Montgomery App. 2008-Ohio-6330 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2008). In this case, the culprits forcibly entered a home specifically looking for one of the residents. Id. at ¶ 3. Because the case can be viewed as one in which the culprits intended to confront the victims, it was grouped with the robbery cases and excluded from the burglary cases. Id.

70. Again, I eliminated all cases in which the witnesses had a prior relationship or otherwise knew the identity of the culprit. See supra note 65.

71. For purposes of this study, “night” is defined as an offense committed between the hours of 9:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. or designated as having been committed at “night,” “after dark,” or “during nighttime.” Offenses committed indoors, regardless of time of day, were excluded, as were offenses committed during “evening.” In addition, in twenty-one cases neither the time of day nor the lighting conditions were mentioned, so these were excluded for purposes of calculating the percentage of cases occurring at night.

72. See infra Table 2.
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<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knife</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Assault, No Weapon</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blunt Object</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat of Weapon, No Weapon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Weapon</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Mention of Weapon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From this data, we can determine that numerous estimator variables, which decrease eyewitness identification accuracy, are at play in a substantial majority of the cases studied. The well-documented effect of weapon-focus plays a role in a majority (65.7%) of this group of cases. Poor lighting occurred in a substantial percentage (43%) of the cases. The use of hats, bandanas across the nose and mouth, facial hair, and other disguises applies in a smaller percentage of the cases (11%), but these are all robberies, which also generally involve use of weapons and other estimator variables. Finally, at least 88% of the cases involve serious violent crimes, which will generally involve high levels of stress, another known factor for decreasing the accuracy of identifications.73

Cross-racial identification is also an accuracy-decreasing factor.74 With few exceptions,75 it was not possible to determine from the appellate decisions whether the witnesses and culprits were of different races because the races of the individuals often were not mentioned.76

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73. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 25, at 29.
74. Cross-race identifications are less reliable than same-race identifications. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1501.
Finally, witnesses often view criminal culprits when the witnesses are not in a good physical condition to form an accurate memory of a culprit’s face. For example, in the cases studied, there was an eleven-year-old witness to a murder,77 an elderly victim of a knife-point robbery,78 a witness who was drinking beer at the time of the crime and on painkillers when he identified the defendant,79 and another witness who may have been smoking marijuana.80 One witness of a knife-point robbery viewed a robber who wore a plastic nose and fake glasses,81 while the victim of another robbery had been brutally beaten and left unconscious during the robbery.82 One victim had been shot multiple times,83 and another had a gun pressed to his head when he saw the culprit for a few seconds.84 One sexual assault victim saw her attacker, while being sodomized, as the tape on her eyes came off and she peered through a gap in the pillowcase the attacker had put over her head.85

While any one of these estimator variables makes the identification less likely to be accurate, this study demonstrates that, in violent crime cases such as the vast majority of cases in this study, numerous estimator variables often are present. To provide one of many possible examples, in Howell v. State, the witness viewed a murder committed with a firearm, a highly stressful event to observe.86 The witness saw the killing in low light of the early morning and from about seventy-one feet away.87 It was a cross-race identification, and the witness may have been smoking marijuana at the time.88

The study sheds light on the mix of identification procedures used by police departments in recently decided cases challenging identification

87. Id.
88. Id.
evidence. As mentioned earlier, we cannot extrapolate from these figures and
determine the mix of procedures followed throughout the country, but the
study does provide insights into the procedures followed in cases where
innocence was claimed based on a misidentification.

Scientific research shows that a witness’s first viewing of a suspect is
critical because it affects the witness’s memory of the event. 89 In the case
study reported here, photo arrays, also known as photo lineups or “Packs,”
were the first procedure followed in obtaining the identifications in fifty-eight
cases (60.4%). 90 Show-ups were the first procedure in twenty-two (22.9%) of
the cases. In two of the cases, the witnesses were shown single photos of the
suspects (followed by photo lineups). 91 In another three cases, live lineups
were used first. In two cases, the witnesses viewed mug shots at the police
station first. 92

In three cases, the witnesses identified the suspects not by recollection of
their facial features, but by things like their ears or their shirts. 93 In two cases,
witnesses identified suspects by their tattoos. 94 In other cases, the witnesses
identified the defendants in whole or in part by hearing their voices. 95

Surveillance video was available in several cases, but in only one case did
witnesses first identify the suspect from the video. 96 In another case, the

89. LOFTUS, supra note 25, at 106–08.
90. See infra Table 3.
92. See infra Table 3.
93. In one of the photo lineup cases, the witness identified the defendant from a photo lineup
    based mostly on his ears. She also had provided a description of the suspect, including height and
    race, that varied considerably from the defendant’s characteristics and she did not mention that the
    defendant had a missing tooth. See People v. Rucker, No. 280082, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 2236, at
    *1–2 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2008). In yet another photo lineup case, the victim did not see the
    defendant’s face during the assault but identified him based on his build and on his statement that the
    victims had “told on him,” which the victims believed referred to an earlier incident involving the
    3154, at *2–6 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2008). In one of the show-up cases, the witness could not see
    the culprit’s face but identified a man police caught in the area by his shirt, build, race, and age. See
    2008).
94. In Scarborough, a rape victim worked with a police sketch artist to develop a composite
    sketch of a tattoo, followed by her out-of-court viewing of photos of the suspect’s tattoos. State v.
    Crim. App. Mar. 17, 2009). In Commonwealth v. Crook, the witness was shown a single photo of the
    2008).
identification was followed by a show-up.97

Table 3. Types of Identification Procedures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identification Procedure</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Photo Lineup</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>60.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show-Ups</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified Physical Attribute Other than Face (Tattoo, Voice)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live Lineup</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Photo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viewed Mug Shots</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Police Involvement or No Information on Procedure</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Court Identification</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viewed Surveillance Video</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This group of cases presents a large number of estimator variables that decrease identification accuracy; the next question is how often police investigators followed the protocols recommended for reducing suggestiveness. The study did not include cases in which photo arrays or live lineups were conducted via the double-blind or sequential method, which is advanced in the reform proposals. In a few of the cases (6.2%), police officers read admonitions (usually that the culprit may or may not be in the show-up or photo array) to witnesses before they viewed a suspect in a show-up or photo array. This suggests that in some jurisdictions admonitions have been introduced as standard procedure. In none of the cases, however, did the admonition include an assurance that the investigation would continue even if the witness failed to identify anyone at that time, as suggested in some reform proposals.98

In a larger number of cases, police officers used practices that can decrease identification accuracy. For example, in thirteen cases (13.5%) police officers told witnesses that a suspect had been arrested or taken into custody, a practice that suggests to a witness that the police have other evidence to prove the suspect is guilty.99 A key procedure recommended for cases involving multiple witnesses is that they should be kept apart during an identification procedure and should be instructed not to discuss their identification with other witnesses;100 however, witnesses were kept together

98. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
100. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 53.
during identification procedures in ten (10.4%) cases. In four cases (4.2%), the police gave confirmatory feedback after the identification was made, which has been shown to boost a witness’s confidence level and taint the later in-court identification process.

Table 4. Use of Suggestive Procedures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suggestive Procedure</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Witness Told Suspect in Custody</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witnesses Viewed Suspect Together</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Gave Confirmatory Feedback</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Social science also warns that showing the photo of a suspect in more than one photo array may cause “unconscious transference.” There are several cases in this study in which the police showed a witness the defendant’s photo in more than one photo array and the witness was unable to select the defendant’s photo, but the witness was nonetheless able to identify the defendant at a preliminary hearing or at trial. In these cases the witnesses did not identify the defendants on the first try, but were able to do so on a second attempt. The concern is that a witness may have unconsciously transferred the image of the defendant’s face from the photo array and then erroneously believed that the image was part of the memory of the crime. Sometimes this unconscious transference can occur through no fault of the

101. In an additional case, one witness told a second witness that she had identified the defendant in the show-up, despite being told by police not to talk to the other witness. The second witness then confidently identified the defendant, although she said that the culprit wore a different outfit. People v. Nelson, Nos. B195996, B205753, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4472, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. June 2, 2008).

102. See supra Part II.A. In one of the cases, the witness stated that the confirmatory feedback made her “feel better.” See Shabazz v. State, 667 S.E.2d 414, 417 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).

103. See LOFTUS, supra note 25, at 142–44; LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 25, at 106–08.

police, but in other cases police practices can create the potential for the problem to occur.

IV. JUDICIAL TOLERANCE OF SUGGESTIVE IDENTIFICATION PRACTICES

It is nearly impossible to determine whether there are any wrongful convictions among the dozens of cases in this study. A few cases raise serious concerns due to the presence of multiple estimator variables that reduce accuracy, the use of suggestive police procedures, and the absence of corroborating evidence. Due to the nature of the encounters in so many of the cases involving robbery or assaults with firearms, there is generally no possibility of obtaining DNA evidence from the crime scenes. Thus, these prosecutions hinge on eyewitness identification of culprits observed under conditions most likely to lead to misidentification. Are all of the individuals in the study actually guilty? Juries were willing to find that they were. The fact that some of these cases could have resulted in convictions “beyond a reasonable doubt” is highly troubling. Without strong corroborating identification evidence, the law should not permit convictions based on eyewitness identification. At a minimum, the law should not continue to allow the introduction of eyewitness identifications obtained by the police using procedures that, as indicated by scientific research, create an increased risk of error in identification.

The study presented here examined appellate court reaction in cases involving serious challenges to eyewitness identification testimony. The findings are quite sobering. Of the ninety-six cases studied, only two resulted in reversals, and in both cases the error was based on something other than the eyewitness identification evidence. In State v. Washington, for example, a

105. In one case, the defendant claimed that he had been in the store as an innocent bystander during the armed robbery and that the witnesses erroneously remembered him as the robber instead. People v. Robinson, No. 276889, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 743, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2008). If true, this would be a classic form of unconscious transference.

106. See Gross et al., supra note 1, at 530–31.

107. See BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 207–09 (1995) (summarizing survey studies, prediction studies, and mock juror studies, and concluding that “jurors are generally insensitive to factors that influence eyewitness identification accuracy, often rely on factors (such as recall of peripheral details) that are not diagnostic of witness accuracy, and rely heavily on one factor, eyewitness confidence, that possesses only modest value as an indicator of witness accuracy”).

108. See generally Thompson, supra note 2 (arguing in favor of a corroborating evidence requirement for admission of eyewitness identification testimony); see also Noah Clements, Flipping a Coin: A Solution for the Inherent Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 40 IND. L. REV. 271, 272, 290 (2007) (proposing a blanket exclusion of eyewitness identification testimony in criminal cases).

North Carolina court of appeals reversed a conviction based on an unnecessary and unreasonable delay of nearly five years and its effects on witness memory.\(^\text{110}\) In one other case, a Michigan appellate court upheld the exclusion of a pre-trial identification (on Fourth Amendment grounds) but then affirmed the admission of in-court identifications by the same witnesses.\(^\text{111}\) Thus, in only one case was there a total preclusion of identification testimony, and that was based on a violation of the defendant’s speedy trial right.\(^\text{112}\) In every other case, the eyewitnesses were permitted to provide eyewitness identification testimony in some form.

A. Claims of Unduly Suggestive Procedures and Unreliability

The United States Supreme Court has fashioned a due process exclusionary remedy for unduly suggestive identification procedures; however, even an unduly suggestive identification need not be excluded if it is determined to be sufficiently reliable.\(^\text{113}\) The federal standard for determining reliability calls on courts to take into account five factors in evaluating the totality of the circumstances:

\begin{itemize}
\item[] The opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime,
\item[] the witness’ degree of attention,
\item[] the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal,
\item[] the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and
\item[] the length of time between the crime and
\end{itemize}

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{110. 665 S.E.2d 799, 812 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008). The defendant’s primary claim was that the avoidable delay by the prosecution caused the eyewitnesses’ memories to fade, creating a serious risk of misidentification. \textit{Id.} at 811–12; \textit{see also} People v. Earle, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 261, 266–67 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). In \textit{Earle}, the trial court refused to sever an indecent exposure case supported by strong evidence from a sexual assault case in which the eyewitness’s description of the attacker differed greatly from the defendant’s actual appearance. \textit{Id.} at 266. The victim in each case also gave different descriptions of her respective assailant’s vehicle. \textit{Id.} Additionally, the sexual assault victim had managed to break loose from her attacker, but the defendant was a world-class competitor in the sport of “submission grappling.” \textit{Id.} For these reasons, the appeals court found that there was “fertile ground for a reasonable doubt in jurors’ minds that the victim had correctly identified defendant as her assailant.” \textit{Id.} The joinder of the less serious indecent exposure case, for which there was strong evidence, thus “played a central role, and quite possibly a decisive one, in securing a conviction on the assault charge.” \textit{Id.} at 267.}

\footnote{111. \textit{See} People v. Leonard, No. 270638, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1110, at *1, 41–43 (Mich. Ct. App. May 27, 2008). The Supreme Court has permitted the admission of in-court identification testimony, even if the pre-trial identification testimony is excluded, if there is a finding that the in-court identification is based on an independent recollection of the events and is not the product of the tainted identification procedure. \textit{See} United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967).}

\footnote{112. \textit{Washington}, 665 S.E.2d at 812.}

\end{footnotesize}
the confrontation.\textsuperscript{114}

This five-factor test, fashioned in 1972, has been roundly criticized for including witness certainty as a factor when social science research shows that witness confidence in an identification does not necessarily correlate with accuracy, and that a witness’s confidence level has a tendency to rise as the witness moves through the criminal justice process.\textsuperscript{115} Nonetheless, state appellate courts, with few exceptions, continue to apply this test (including the witness confidence prong) in assessing federal and state due process claims.\textsuperscript{116} Courts seem unfamiliar with, or unpersuaded by, the scientific research on witness confidence, and they erroneously rely on witness certainty in evaluating the reliability of the identification.\textsuperscript{117}

In addition, the Supreme Court’s decisions focus solely on police conduct in determining whether the identification process was “unduly suggestive,” which is the basis for a due process claim.\textsuperscript{118} Thus, cases in which suggestion is introduced by a private citizen or in which identifications are simply unreliable due to the presence of multiple estimator variables—through no fault of the police—do not raise a due process issue.\textsuperscript{119}

These cases raise a variety of claims relating to eyewitness identification. In many cases, defendants challenge the identification testimony on due process grounds, claiming that the procedures used to obtain the identification were unduly suggestive and that the resulting identification is unreliable.\textsuperscript{120}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{114} Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199–200.
\item \textsuperscript{115} See Shaw & McClure, supra note 56, at 629–30; see generally Timothy P. O’Toole & Giovanna Shay, Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited: Towards a New Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 109, 120–22 (2006) (calling for an updated rule in part because witness confidence levels are not necessarily strongly correlated with accuracy and can be infected by suggestion).
\item \textsuperscript{116} See infra notes 136–37 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{117} See, e.g., People v. Gandara, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4780, at *17–18 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. June 12, 2008) (identification was reliable in part because the witness “did not have any doubts when she picked out Gandara’s photograph” over a year after the crime).
\item \textsuperscript{118} The U.S. Supreme Court has only decided cases in which identification procedures were conducted by the police and has not considered suggestive procedures employed by private parties. In Manson v. Brathwaite, for example, the Court framed the question as follows: “[W]hether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment compels the exclusion, in a state criminal trial, apart from any consideration of reliability, of pretrial identification evidence obtained by a police procedure that was both suggestive and unnecessary.” 432 U.S. at 99 (emphasis added). But see State v. Chen, 952 A.2d 1094, 1105–06 (holding that New Jersey evidence rules require that courts grant “a preliminary hearing when the reliability of State’s identification evidence is called into question by evidence of highly suggestive words or conduct by private actors that pose a significant risk of misidentification”).
\item \textsuperscript{119} See, e.g., People v. Richards, No. F054916, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9262, at *15–16 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2008) (noting that no authority exists for the proposition that conduct by private citizens can be the basis for a motion to exclude identification testimony).
\item \textsuperscript{120} See infra notes 122, 127 and accompanying text.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Sometimes, misidentification claims are incorporated into claims of ineffectiveness of counsel when purported counsel errors relate to eyewitness identification evidence.\(^{121}\)

One type of due process claim centers on the makeup of a photographic lineup or live lineup. Defendants argue that these lineups are unduly suggestive either because the defendant is the only person in the group who fits the witness’s description or because the defendant’s photo is said to “stand out.”\(^ {122}\) Courts generally reject these claims and find that the other persons in the lineup are sufficiently similar to the defendant in appearance, and, thus, the lineup is not unduly suggestive.\(^ {123}\) This is the case even if the defendant’s photo is the only one with a different color background or is a different size than the rest,\(^ {124}\) because courts focus instead only on the similarity of features of the individuals in the photos; sometimes even the dissimilarity of the individuals’ features is not considered important. In People v. Lloyd, for example, the court rejected such a claim despite the fact that both witnesses stated that the people in most of the photos either did not match the description or were too old to be the culprit.\(^ {125}\) The Lloyd court concluded that, despite the fact that individuals in up to four of the six photos “may have looked too old, thereby eliminating them from consideration by the eyewitnesses, [that] does not mean that the witnesses were thereby forced to misidentify [the] defendant.”\(^ {126}\)

Several other cases challenged the suggestiveness of show-ups. In People v. Acosta, the appellate court rejected the defendant’s challenge to the use of a show-up.\(^ {127}\) The defendant cited the U.S. Department of Justice Guide and a California Department of Justice District Attorney’s Association Field Guide for the proposition that field show-ups are “automatically


\(^{122}\) See, e.g., People v. Rutledge, No. A117967, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5995 (Cal. Ct. App. July 24, 2008) (defendant was the only person in the lineup with braids); People v. Romero, 892 N.E.2d 1122, 1125 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (defendant was the only person in the photo array with a teardrop tattoo).


\(^{126}\) Id. at *8–9.

suggestive.” The court relied on precedent in rejecting the contention that a show-up should be considered automatically suggestive and instead applied the same five factors of the federal due process test. Interestingly, the court rejected the contention that the show-up was suggestive despite two facts indicating otherwise: (1) it was a single-person field show-up; and (2) the police told the witness that the defendant was the person they had arrested. The court stated that telling the witness that the police had arrested the suspect “was not particularly suggestive, as most people asked to make an identification at a show-up would probably assume that a person detained by police as a suspect is probably under arrest.” This conclusion flies in the face of social science literature and common sense. It is precisely because people will assume that the police believe that a person displayed in a one-person show-up is guilty that the use of show-ups is suggestive. If an officer confirms a person’s belief that the police have enough evidence to arrest the person, the problem of suggestiveness is only exacerbated.

Appellate courts also seem to misunderstand the dangers of confirmatory feedback, leading them to reject claims on the grounds that the feedback, given after the identification is made, does not render the selection process suggestive. Contrary to courts’ position, scientific studies indicate that the danger of such feedback is that it can vastly elevate the confidence level that a witness will later report from the level that the witness actually experienced at the time of the selection. Thus, the problem with confirmatory feedback is not that it renders the identification process “suggestive,” but that it creates a tendency to bolster a witness’s perception of his or her true level of confidence. Thus, the witness later will overstate his or her certainty in the identification, when the true level of confidence might have been much lower without the confirmatory feedback. Of course, there is still the problem that witness confidence statements, with or without confirmatory feedback, are notoriously unreliable anyway.

Even when defendants cite to reform proposals and ask courts to require

128. Id. at *7.
129. Id. at *6–7. The court cited the California Supreme Court decision that adopted the federal test. Id. (reiterating the test from People v. Cunningham, 25 P.3d 519 (Cal. 2001)).
131. Id. at *8.
132. See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., supra note 10 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
the police to follow less suggestive procedures, the courts decline to impose such requirements on the police as a matter of either evidentiary or constitutional law. Instead, the courts simply follow the five-factor test in *Manson v. Brathwaite*, including the scientifically invalid witness confidence prong.

**B. Claims Challenging Jury Instructions on Eyewitness Identification or Decisions to Exclude Expert Testimony**

Two areas left within the discretion of the trial court are the issuance of jury instructions and the admission of expert testimony. Appellate courts usually reject challenges to the exclusion of expert witness testimony on eyewitness identifications. Sometimes, the claims are rejected on the basis that there was sufficient corroborating identification evidence. Other times, the appellate courts find that the decision is a matter within the trial court’s discretion, that jury instructions and the argument of counsel suffice to alert the jury about the issues with eyewitness identification testimony, or that the jury is sufficiently able to evaluate the testimony without the assistance of an

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136. *See, e.g.*, Smith, 946 A.2d at 327 (concluding without explanation that “[d]ue process does not require the suppression of a photographic identification that is not the product of a double-blind, sequential procedure”); Gibson v. State, 661 S.E.2d 850, 854 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (failure to read admonition form did not render a lineup procedure impermissibly suggestive); *Allen*, 274 S.W.3d at 525 (rejecting the claim that police should use blind administration of lineups and make a written record of a witness’s responses at the moment of identification because not required by state law); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 663 S.E.2d 536, 539 (Va. Ct. App. 2008) (rejecting the need for a sequential, double-blind photo lineup). *But see* People v. Bryant, No. A114925, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3154, at *13–14 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2008) (defense attorney was not prevented from asking an expert witness about the DOJ’s position on double-blind, sequential photo lineups).


138. *See supra* note 115 and accompanying text.

expert (and presumably without any assistance at all). Indeed, in some cases the courts even have shown hostility toward the idea of admitting expert testimony on the science of eyewitness identification.

Not only is witness confidence erroneously considered in the due process reliability test, courts in some jurisdictions compound the error by also instructing juries to consider it in evaluating the reliability of identification testimony. Many cases in the study challenge the use of this jury instruction. In People v. Nelson, for example, a California court of appeals upheld the use of this standard jury instruction that instructs jurors to consider “the extent to which the witness is either certain or uncertain of the identification.”

Further, a due process challenge to the use of this instruction was rejected in People v. Ruiz, despite the fact that the court agreed that “there may be little correlation between a witness’s certainty and reliability of the identification.” Defendants sometimes also seek reversal because trial courts have refused to give cautionary jury instructions on police suggestion in the eyewitness identification process.

140. See, e.g., People v. Fowlkes, No. B198406, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6971, at *22 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2008) (permitting the expert to offer his opinion would have improperly allowed the judge and jury to shift responsibility for the decision to the witness); State v. Allen, 274 S.W.3d 514, 526 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (exclusion may be based on a theory that jurors can “‘rely on their own experience to reach a judgment on what weight to give eyewitness evidence’“) (internal citation omitted).

141. In Bolden, for example, the trial court rejected the admission of expert testimony, according to the appellate court, on the ground that “Shomer [the expert witness] ‘seemed like an advocate’ and had overstated the importance of certain factors.” 2008 Cal. App. LEXIS 10253, at *14–15; People v. Ruiz, No. E044016, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8960, at *18 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2008) (referring to scientific findings on witness certainty as “certain experts’ opinions that have not yet achieved widespread acceptance in California jurisprudence”).


143. 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8960, at *16. In Ruiz, the court rejected the due process challenge to the instruction despite the fact that experts have stated that witness confidence does not correlate with accuracy. Id. at *15–16. The court concluded that to find a due process violation “would essentially be binding the jury to accept certain experts’ opinions that have not yet achieved widespread acceptance in California jurisprudence.” Id. at *18. The court also found no error in the “alleged ‘contradiction’ between defendant’s expert testimony and the trial court’s jury instruction.” Id. at *19.

144. People v. Wells, No. B200441, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7859, at *10–11, 15–16 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2008) (affirming the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury to consider whether “police exercised coercion or deception or suggestion in the identification process” and, if so, “whether or not it was of such a nature as to be reasonably likely to produce a misidentification”); People v. Deo, Nos. C047126, C046880, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4822, at *12–13 (Cal. Ct.
Even if identification evidence was erroneously admitted or expert testimony erroneously excluded, the conviction will not be reversed when there is sufficient corroborating evidence of identification (and, thus, less risk of misidentification). Thus, corroborating evidence of identification plays a role at the back end of the process, but it is not a requirement for admission of identification testimony.

The Nelson case raises so many troubling issues that it justifies a closer look. First, it is a prime candidate for scientifically sound jury instructions on the limited relevance of witness confidence in evaluating identification reliability. In Nelson, the defendant was convicted of committing two similar robberies of the same fast-food restaurant. There was no corroborating evidence of identification and, other than the eyewitness’s identification testimony, other critical facts indeed tended to exonerate the suspect. For example, the robber had worn a black sweatshirt with a white shirttail hanging out from underneath, but the defendant was arrested in a nearby park soon after the robbery wearing a “blue or purple shirt.” According to the court, “[o]ne of the deputies testified that criminals commonly wear multiple layers of clothing during crimes, so that they can avoid detection afterwards by shedding a layer of clothing.” There are at least three problems with this theory: (1) the robber had worn the same black sweatshirt in the two robberies for which Nelson was tried, which is not consistent with the “shedding a layer” idea; (2) the robber wore the same clothes to the same restaurant on two occasions, suggesting that this was not a particularly calculating robber; and (3) the layer of clothing under the black sweatshirt was white, but

App. June 13, 2008) (affirming the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury to be cautious in considering eyewitness identifications).


146. See generally Thompson, supra note 2 (arguing in favor of a corroboration requirement for admission of eyewitness identification testimony).


148. The robber’s face was not clear on surveillance videos of the two robberies, and no fingerprints were found on the knife found on the ground near an alley. Id. at *5 n.2, 6.

149. Id. at *4. It is not uncommon for suspects not to match witness descriptions. See, e.g., People v. Earle, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 261, 266 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (victim characterized the assailant as looking Mexican and skinny, but the defendant clearly looked northern European and had an athletic build with a bull neck; the defendant also had a deeply furrowed brow and protruding, possibly damaged ears, which the victim did not mention); People v. Fowlkes, No. B198406, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6971, at *4–5, 7 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2008) (appellant had a shaved head, but the shooter had “hair on his head” and the appellant appeared to have lighter skin than he did on the day of the shooting; victim also described the car as a white two-door Dodge Neon with a green emblem on the back, but the co-defendant drove a white, four-door Honda Civic with no green sign or emblem on the back).

defendant was found wearing a blue or purple shirt. In addition, the police officers found a small amount of currency on the ground near the knife that was recovered, but they did not recover the black sweatshirt or the white shirt worn underneath.

Moreover, the police could not account for the other money stolen in the second robbery, moments before Nelson’s arrest. He was found with only a small amount of money on him when arrested. A deputy testified that criminals commonly attempt to avoid detection by disposing of loot after a robbery. However the defendant would not have had time to spend the money, and it makes little sense to think he would throw the stolen money away on the off chance that he might be arrested.

In addition, even the identification testimony was not particularly solid. First, all the identifications were cross-racial, which are scientifically shown to be less reliable. Scientific findings indicate that such identifications are less accurate even if the witness harbors no significant biases and has had frequent interactions with persons of that race. Yet at trial, one witness was allowed to testify that she had “friends and coworkers who were African-American, and could distinguish between different people of that race.” The second witness also testified to a professed ability to distinguish people of different races.

The witnesses also did not inspire confidence in their true ability to recognize the culprit. At trial, the victim of the first robbery, Mr. Hernandez, said he did not get a good look at the robber’s face. He could not give a positive identification of Mr. Nelson, but he was nonetheless allowed to testify that the defendant looked “‘familiar’” to him. After the second robbery, Ms. Martinez, who had viewed both robberies, testified that she was “positive” that the defendant was the robber; however, she had shown less confidence when she identified him just after the second robbery. Ms. Martinez viewed the defendant in a show-up at which he was illuminated with bright lights, without handcuffs, and not wearing a black sweatshirt as the

151. Id. at *3–6.
152. Id. at *4.
153. Id.
154. Id. at *6.
155. Id.
156. Id. at *3–6.
157. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1501.
159. Id. at *6.
160. Id. at *3.
161. Id.
162. Id.
robber had worn. She said that she recognized the defendant’s face (because his clothes were different) but wanted to be sure, so she asked to hear his voice. Only after he spoke the words, “Open the register,” did she identify him. Ms. Martinez said she then was “a hundred percent sure that it was him.”

However, social science research on voice identification shows that attempts to recognize an unfamiliar voice, based on minimal interaction under stressful circumstances, are highly unreliable, and yet witnesses will exhibit high confidence in their abilities to make such identifications.

Ms. Martinez then told the second witness, Ms. Diaz, that she had identified the defendant, despite being told not to do so by the police. In this way, she tainted Ms. Diaz’s identification. Ms. Diaz then stated that she could identify the defendant by his face even though he was wearing “‘a whole different . . . outfit.’” When this witness viewed Mr. Nelson, he was wearing handcuffs. She also stated that she was positive that he was the robber, relying on her recollection of his face.

Ms. Diaz’s identification is tainted by several suggestive facts: (1) the defendant was the only person shown to the witness by the police; (2) the previous witness told the second witness that she had identified the defendant; and (3) the defendant was shown to the witness while the defendant was wearing handcuffs and having bright lights shined on him. Given that the first witness had already identified Mr. Nelson as the robber, there was no need for a second show-up. Presumably, the police could have organized a live lineup for the second witness instead.

Again, it is impossible to know from reading the appellate case law whether someone like Mr. Nelson is actually guilty or not. The jury found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the sole basis of eyewitness testimony, which rested in large part on voice identification by the principal witness. Mr. Nelson is serving a fourteen-year prison sentence. His
appeal challenged the admission of the eyewitness testimony on several grounds, including the use of a jury instruction that told jurors to *take into account* witness confidence in determining the reliability of the testimony. Ideally, the instruction would instead warn jurors *not* to give weight to witness confidence. In reviewing Mr. Nelson’s challenge to the use of the jury instruction on witness confidence, the lower appellate court simply deferred to the California Supreme Court’s approval of the instruction and found “no impropriety” in the use of the witness confidence factor listed in the standard jury instruction.

V. CONCLUSION

The innocence movement, armed with DNA evidence, has led to the release of hundreds of people who had been wrongly convicted. Influential groups have reacted by devoting a great deal of study to arrive at scientifically supported recommendations for preventing future miscarriages of justice. Having marked the ten-year anniversary of the DOJ’s *Guidelines for Eyewitness Identifications*, it behooves us to evaluate the implementation stage of the innocence reform movement. Unfortunately, the improved procedures have not been widely mandated through the political process. A paltry number of jurisdictions have adopted the recommended procedures—only two states and a handful of local law enforcement agencies have adopted the key procedures recommended for eyewitness identifications, such as sequential, double-blind administration of lineups and photo arrays. Can we rely on the police departments themselves to adopt the changes? In this country, there are almost 19,000 independent police departments, and there are no widely followed professional accreditation standards that might impose the recommended procedures as a condition for accreditation. The failure of the political process to mandate such changes has left virtually all law enforcement agencies in forty-seven states free to ignore the scientific

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175. *Id.* at *1–2, 9–10.
176. *Id.* at *11.
177. *See supra* note 1 and accompanying text.
178. *See supra* note 39 and accompanying text.
179. *See supra* note 13 and accompanying text.
180. *See supra* notes 39–51 and accompanying text.
182. *See* Thompson, *supra* note 2, at 1520 (stating that “only a fraction of police departments have applied for national accreditation status,” so it is not considered an effective way to regulate police practices).
findings and recommendations for change, and that would appear to be precisely what they have done. The same, faulty eyewitness identification practices of the past that produced hundreds of erroneous convictions continue to be used today.

The study presented in this Article has shown that in a large number of robbery, murder, and assault cases there continue to be grave concerns about eyewitness misidentification of innocent defendants. Unfortunately, DNA evidence is not available in most robbery or murder cases, so any innocent persons who are wrongly identified are not likely to be exonerated in the fashion of those wrongly convicted of sexual assaults in the past. Is there any reason to believe that eyewitness-victims in sexual assault cases are more prone to err in identification than eyewitness-victims in robbery or homicide cases? In a word: No. There is no reason to think robbery victims make for better eyewitnesses than sexual assault victims. Indeed, misidentifications in robberies most likely occur at a greater rate than in rapes because “robberies are frequently quick, and may involve less immediate physical contact,” making an accurate identification less likely. Thus, the number of wrongly convicted persons undoubtedly is many times greater than the number of exonerated individuals.

We may never have the means to detect the scores of innocent people who have been wrongly arrested for robberies, murders, and other violent crimes due to erroneous eyewitness identification. However, at a minimum, courts can refuse to apply scientifically unsound due process tests and jury instructions, and they can admit expert testimony to educate the jurors of the pitfalls of the identification process. Courts can also cite the failure to follow state-of-the-art practices and note the estimator variables at play in a particular case (like use of a weapon or disguise) as part of the “totality of the circumstances” in deciding state due process claims. Instead, the study reported here shows a disappointing failure of state appellate courts to show leadership in ensuring greater accuracy in the criminal justice system.

183. See Gross et al., supra note 1, at 530.

184. Id.

185. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1493 (noting that in 2004 there were over four times as many robberies committed as there were rapes, 401,470 to 95,089); Gross et al., supra note 1, at 531 (rape exonerations are the “tip of the iceberg” and do not include a much larger group of undetected false convictions for robberies and other serious crimes of violence for which DNA is unavailable).