

Editorial

Marquette University

Follow this and additional works at: <http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr>



Part of the [Law Commons](#)

Repository Citation

Marquette University, *Editorial*, 11 Marq. L. Rev. 98 (1927).

Available at: <http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol11/iss2/6>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

Marquette Law Review

PUBLISHED DECEMBER, FEBRUARY, APRIL, AND JUNE BY THE STUDENTS OF MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW. \$2.00 PER ANNUM. 60 CENTS PER CURRENT NUMBER

Editorial Staff

BENTLEY COURTENAY, *Editor-in-Chief*
HOWARD M. KALUPSKE, *Business Manager*
J. ARTHUR MORAN, *Advertising Manager*
JAMES P. TAUGHER
PAUL A. HOLMES
THOMAS A. BYRNE
ELMER GOODLAND

CARL B. RIX, *Faculty*
CARL ZOLLMANN, *Faculty*
WILLIS E. LANG, *Faculty*
H. WM. IHRIG
ROLAND K. WILDE
RICHARD J. PATTERSON
CYRUS D. SHABAZ

ISIDORE E. GOLDBERG

Unless the LAW REVIEW receives notice to the effect that a subscriber wishes his subscription discontinued, it is assumed that a continuation is desired.

An earnest attempt is made to print only authoritative matter. The articles and comments, wherever possible, are accompanied by the name or initials of the writer; the Editorial Board assumes no responsibility for statements appearing in the REVIEW.

EDITORIAL

The article by Carl Zollman on the diploma privilege recites some memorable fights in the history of legal education in its constant struggle for higher standards of Bar requirements. It paints the diploma privilege in its true light—as a special privilege—which discriminates in a manifestly unfair manner wherever it is tolerated, and acts as a leash upon the most commendable efforts of such representative groups as the American Bar Association, the Carnegie Foundation and most state bar associations, including Wisconsin, in their struggle toward higher standards in the legal profession.

To enumerate the great host of national and international figures, such as Chief Justice William Howard Taft, Elihu Root, and Dean Roscoe Pound, who oppose such a privilege, is but to emphasize the already obvious and generally conceded point—that no one should be allowed to practice law until he has carefully been examined by competent public authority other than that associated with the school in which he was trained.

It must be conceded, and is by all broad and thinking people, that any exception to such a rule is detrimental to the general healthy condition of the profession, and should for no good reason be tolerated.

The Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, attended by Deans Max Schoetz, Jr., and H. S. Richards, as Commissioners from Wisconsin, has recommended to the states for ratification in the last two years, nine acts, the number and subjects of which clearly emphasize the effect of the strong movement toward uniformity. These acts were approved and submitted to the states:

- Uniform Arbitration Act.
- Uniform Interparty Agreement Act.
- Uniform Joint Obligations Act.
- Uniform Written Obligations Act.
- Uniform Firearm's Act.
- Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.
- Uniform Motor Vehicle Act.
- Uniform Federal Tax Lien Act.
- Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act.

The advisability of drastic uniform legislation on multitudinous subjects may well be questioned for many reasons, but it cannot be denied that much could be accomplished toward the end of avoiding needless conflicts by conservative but serious consideration of the recommendations of the Conference.

The amount of the courts' time which is being taken up by litigation concerning automobile collisions and the disputes arising therefrom, provokes a perfectly natural inquiry as to the cause for this great mass of lawsuits. It may be the result of increased congestion due to the larger number of motor vehicles in use, or more probably, it may be the result of drivers' ignorance.

Passing from the first influence, which may be accepted as a natural development of the times, to a consideration of the latter, it must be conceded at the outset that, in spite of the age-old adage about ignorance of the law, the average driver, except in the very common instances, is really not to blame for ignorance of the host of traffic regulations which has been foisted upon the motoring public. The present condition of the state traffic laws, as affected by the county regulations, as affected by the city ordinances, as affected by city police regulations, renders the whole an unintelligible mess, and leaves even the local city driver in hopeless confusion.

The cloak of responsibility which surrounds the driver of a motor vehicle does not render his status so complex that expeditious rules for his conduct cannot be formulated. The situation is no more involved than many others which the law has sought, with considerable success, to clarify.

Let us promulgate definite rules for "right of way," for speed, for the manner of turning, for the manner of parking, and then educate the people *before* law violations and collisions rather than *after*. There are a few who heedlessly offend, but a fairly general knowledge of a few simple and uniform regulations would allow scores of the present ignorant violators to decide questions of liability which, under the present state of affairs, the courts have trouble in solving. The result, if not a considerable diminution in the number of accidents, would at least be a great relief to the courts.

Why this jargon of uncomprehensible, unenforceable "don'ts"?