Commissioned for the Inaugural International Intellectual Property Scholars Series, this article fills the void by examining intellectual property developments in relation to the decades-old 'Asian values' debate. Drawing on the region's diversity in economic and technological developments and the continuous rivalry among the different regional powers, the article contends that one can neither locate any distinct values, approaches, or practices on intellectual property law and policy nor identify any established pan-Asian positions in the area.

The article further explores the role Asian countries will play if these emerging countries exert more influence on the development of the international intellectual property system. It points out that, although Japan and South Korea are unlikely to join others to form a united front for the Asian developing world, China, India, and ASEAN members may be willing to work together to form a normative community. This article concludes with a discussion of ten key items that will find their way to the community's common policy agenda if such a community indeed exists.

This Comment will examine major court decisions concerning software patentability, culminating in Bilski v. Kappos, and use the decisions in those cases to discern where the future of DRM patentability lies. This will require particular attention to what will ultimately be the crux of the matter—the implementation of algorithms in DRM, and how the courts have analyzed patent subject matter in regards to claims involving algorithms. This will lead to the determination as to whether precedent in decisions involving algorithms is consistent, whether it is helpful, and whether Bilski helped or hindered the case for encryption’s patentability. While the recent decision in Bilski may have elicited a sigh of relief for some DRM encryption providers and advocates, the future of DRM encryptions might stand on more precarious footing than appears. With its war on two fronts against the open source movement and copyright purists, the patentability of cryptographic technologies, and DRM entirely, might not survive long in a post-Bilski world.

Even though some may allege that Emerging Celebrities can elect not to enter into these contracts, no other reasonable alternatives exist for Emerging Celebrities who want to achieve their specific career goals. Therefore, state courts should statutorily limit the length of time and amount of profit the reality television and college sports industries can contractually receive from Emerging Celebrities. This Comment will discuss the potential legal injustice of publicity rights clauses in industry standard contracts, and propose a potential solution in the form of statutory limitations imposed through individual state laws.

The tax code and regulations provide several potential methods to answer this question. This Comment will explore the interactions between some of those tax code provisions, specifically 26 U.S.C. § 197, and to a lesser degree, I.R.S. Revenue Procedure 2000-50, and the intellectual property rights associated with websites. Part II of this Comment presents a hypothetical, which will demonstrate how a website’s intellectual property rights interact with some of the current tax laws. Part III will briefly explore how the intellectual property rights of copyright, patent, and trademark apply to websites, with particular emphasis on the issues that copyrights have with websites. Part IV will explore the history of intangible asset amortization, which culminated in the creation of 26 U.S.C. § 197 in 1993. Part IV will discuss the way websites’ intellectual property rights interact with section 197 and Revenue Procedure 2000-50. Part V of this Comment will discuss conclusions and some potential solutions for the problems presented by the tax code and regulations.

The conventional approach to the optimal scope of trade dress rights could be challenged by a reassessment of the effect of their protection on competition. This Paper conducts an economic analysis of trade dress protection based on the theory of product differentiation. In economic terms, the choice of trade dress amounts to a business decision to differentiate by product design. Differentiation allows the exercise of market power within the market niche consisting of the consumers that have a preference for a specific product design. Despite this price, premium consumer welfare increases overall because the existence of product variety allows for the satisfaction of diverse consumer preferences. Competition becomes more dynamic as firms seek to market products that come closer to the taste of the targeted consumer group.

The main implication for trademark and unfair competition theory is that the intangible value of goodwill created by product differentiation should be protected against free-riding. Such protection is not simply intended to favor the trademark holder, but rather to promote dynamic competition with differentiated products. In view of the principle of complementarity between intellectual property rights and competition law, this Paper analyzes how trademark and unfair competition law could regulate imitative activity in the marketplace so as to foster the effectiveness of competition.

On the other hand, trade dress protection might lead to monopolization of submarkets and suppress locational competition in product space. These anticompetitive effects could be effectively addressed by an application of the functionality doctrine. The submarket analysis links the limits of trade dress rights to the valuations of the Sherman Act.

This Paper also examines the phenomenon of the cumulative protection of trade dress through copyright, patent and trademark law. In this context, it also addresses the problem of determining the circumstances under which trade dress becomes the practical equivalent of an expired patent, a question left open by the Supreme Court in Traffix.

Courts have reacted differently and consequently, three general theoretical approaches have emerged. Examples of each can be presented by looking at courts in France, Germany, and the United States. Courts in France impose full liability for willful trademark infringement if the sale of counterfeit goods is shown. The German Federal Supreme Court approaches the question as one of interference with property rights; if ISPs knowingly allow continued sale of counterfeit merchandise they can be found liable for damages. Lastly, courts in the United States approach the question from the perspective of what the ISP can reasonably be required to do in order to prevent the sale of counterfeit goods on its site.

This Article compares these three theoretical approaches and considers other possible considerations in determining ISP liability. It argues that trademark law today is ill-equipped to handle questions of secondary liability or contributory infringement, and concludes that the safe harbor for ISPs, as tailored in the European E-Commerce Directive, should be given a broad reading and that the prohibition against imposing a general duty to monitor or actively seek facts in Article 15 remain absolute until the defects are remedied. In response to trademark owners’ legitimate concerns, it further argues that trademark owners should pool their resources, in a manner akin to that of Copyright Collective Societies, and form an agency that, by cooperating with, instead of forcing ISPs, could more efficiently and legitimately weed out infringing uses on the internet.

This Comment will provide a basic introduction to trade secrets, the inevitable disclosure doctrine, including a discussion of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Pepsico v. Redmond, and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Furthermore, this Comment will discuss and analyze the different states’ applications of the inevitable disclosure doctrine. Ultimately, a workable standard for the uniform application of inevitable disclosure will be proposed.

In proposing a workable standard, this Comment will argue that the inevitable disclosure doctrine should be applied rarely, and deference should be given to employers that utilize valid employment agreements that are narrowly drafted to specifically protect the employer’s trade secrets. However, in the absence of a valid employment agreement protecting an employer’s trade secrets, an employee should be free to work for an employer of his choosing unless the former employer can prove some kind of bad faith on the part of the employee.