Document Type
Article
Publication Date
11-2016
Publication Information
Alexander B. Lemann, Coercive Insurance and the Soul of Tort Law, 105 Geo. L.J. 55 (2016)
Source Publication
105 Georgetown Law Journal 55 (2016)
Abstract
Scholars have long accepted the idea that there are alternatives to the tort system, particularly insurance, that are better at compensating victims than tort law. Tort law remains necessary, it has been assumed, because insurance lacks the ability to deter conduct that causes harm, and indeed it sometimes creates a moral hazard that increases incentives to engage in risky conduct. Scholars of insurance law, however, have observed that insurance has at its disposal a variety of tools that can help deter risky conduct. Recent technological developments lend dramatic support to this account. New telematics devices being used in automobiles can track acceleration, braking, and even whether a car is exceeding the speed limit on a particular road, allowing insurance companies to identify and penalize individual acts of negligent driving in real time. Insurance can now, in many cases, deter risky conduct more effectively than tort law. And yet tort law incorporates values that insurance cannot.
Repository Citation
Lemann, Alexander, "Coercive Insurance and the Soul of Tort Law" (2016). Faculty Publications. 686.
https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub/686